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COMMENTS 
CIVIL DEATH IS DIFFERENT: AN 
EXAMINATION OF A POST-GRAHAM 
CHALLENGE TO FELON 





“A man without a vote is a man without protection.  He is virtually helpless.”  Out of 




Since the founding, the United States has struggled with the question 
of who should be permitted to vote.  In their first days as political 
communities, some states required prospective voters to adhere to specified 
religions in order to qualify.
2
  As conceptions of citizenship changed 
throughout history, various groups began to lobby for inclusion into the 
 
* J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of Iowa, 2008.  
Many thanks to all who assisted me in completing this Comment.  In particular, I would like 
to thank Joseph Margulies for his comments and suggestions, and Will Singer and Jessica 
Fricke for their assistance in edits. 
1 RANDALL B. WOODS, LBJ: ARCHITECT OF AMERICAN AMBITION 330 (2002) (quoting 
then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson in a statement he gave to the press shortly after the 
approval of the Civil Rights Act of 1957). 
2 Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchisement with Citizenship Theory, 22 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 53, 57 n.36 (2006).  Quakers, Catholics, and Jews were sometimes 
denied the franchise.  Id.  As late as 1777, Vermont enforced religious restrictions on the 
voting franchise.  Alec C. Ewald, An “Agenda for Demolition”: The Fallacy and the Danger 
of the “Subversive Voting” Argument for Felony Disenfranchisement, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 109, 120 n.37 (2004).  However, this practice was largely abandoned with the 
adoption of the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights in 1791.  See id. at 119–20; see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
442 SARAH C. GRADY [Vol. 102 
franchise.
3
  Proponents of disenfranchisement schemes justified their 
exclusions on many bases, but most often relied on popular rhetoric 
suggesting the groups were second-class citizens, not worthy of the honor 
of the ballot box.
4
  In the end, those fighting for suffrage carried the day, 
and the United States modified its laws to include them.
5
  There is one 
group, however, which has still not attained nationwide suffrage: previously 
convicted felons. 
This Comment argues for the abolition of the most extreme form of 
felon disenfranchisement in the United States—Virginia’s lifetime 
disenfranchisement of all individuals convicted of any felony—through the 
framework of an Eighth Amendment challenge.  Part I will discuss the 
history of this practice, including pre-American justifications for stripping 
various groups of the right to vote, and analyze the history of past 
challenges to such schemes.  Part II will argue that, given prior case law and 
the nature of Virginia’s provision, the Eighth Amendment is the best 
vehicle to challenge the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement.  
Finally, Part III will apply the analysis articulated by the Graham Court and 
argue that the Eighth Amendment requires invalidation of Virginia’s 
provision because it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by 
the Constitution. 
I. A HISTORY OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
A. THE ORIGINS OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
The phenomenon of disenfranchisement has a long history reaching 
back to ancient and medieval times.  However, its current form in the 
United States is both overinclusive (in terms of the population upon whom 
disenfranchisement is imposed) and underinclusive (in terms of the range of 
sanctions imposed upon the affected population).  Moreover, when the 
practice was originally brought to the United States from Europe, 
 
3 See Schall, supra note 2, at 70 (discussing the role liberalism plays in the modern 
conception of voting as a right, important both inherently and as a protector of a panoply of 
other substantive rights). 
4 ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS 3 (1997).  There is one interesting exception: women.  
Although some of the anti-Suffragette rhetoric contained overtones of “women-as-second-
class-citizens,” the most popular argument against including women in the franchise 
centered on the notion that politics were dirty and corrupt, and women were too delicate to 
be exposed to the crooked business.  See id. 
5 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting exclusion from voting on the basis 
of race); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1 (granting women the right to vote); U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXIV, § 1 (prohibiting poll taxes in federal elections); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, 
§ 1 (lowering the voting age to eighteen years). 
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permanent disenfranchisement was limited to a discrete range of crimes, all 
closely related to the exercise of the franchise itself.  Ultimately, no legal 
tradition, domestic or foreign, imposed the broad disenfranchisement 
provisions that currently exist in Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, and Virginia 
today.  Part I.A.1 will discuss the ancient history of disenfranchisement, 
while Part I.A.2 will discuss the implementation of disenfranchisement in 
early American history.  
1. Ancient History 
The disenfranchisement of felons long predates the birth of America 
and traces its roots to ancient Greece and Rome, where criminals were 
branded with the status of atimia or infamia, depriving them of all of their 
rights and privileges including the right to vote.
6
  The Greeks and Romans 
dearly coveted these political rights, and losing them was equated with a 
loss of honor and one’s position as a citizen in society.7  As such, the threat 
of this loss was an effective way to deter criminal behavior.
8
  Centuries 
later, European states adopted a similar condition called “outlawry,” which 
deprived certain criminals of all legal protections.
9
  These criminals were 
essentially expelled from the political community, losing even the right of 
legal protection from murder by other citizens.
10
  The underlying crime was 
considered a war on the community, and outlawry was justified as a 
necessary response by the community to assert its control.
11
 
In England, “outlawry” developed into the concept of “attainder” or 
“civil death.”12  All of the criminal’s property was returned to the control of 
the king.
13
  The “attainted criminal was said to be ‘dead in law’ because he 
 
6 ENGIN F. ISIN, BEING POLITICAL 82 (2002); Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, 
Punishment and Democracy: The Disenfranchisement of Nonincarcerated Felons in the 
United States, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 491, 492 (2004). 
7 Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to Society: The German 
Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84 MINN. L. REV. 753, 757 (2000). 
8 Mark E. Thompson, Comment, Don’t Do the Crime if You Ever Intend to Vote Again: 
Challenging the Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 33 
SETON HALL L. REV. 167, 172 (2002). 
9 Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1060 (2002). 
10 Id. 
11 See Thompson, supra note 8, at 172.  This justification bears a resemblance to a 
modern defense of felon disenfranchisement laws—that felons have broken the social 
contract, and therefore do not possess the moral competence to participate in elections. 
12 Schall, supra note 2, at 54. 
13 Id. 
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could not perform any legal function—including, of course, voting.”14  
Civil death, like atimia and infamia, served as a deterrent “because the 
stigma of the loss of civil rights in the small communities of those times 
increased the humiliation and isolation suffered by the offender and his 
family and served as a warning to the rest of the community.”15  It was used 
sparingly, however.  As Blackstone explained, civil death was used only 
“when it is . . . clear beyond all dispute, that the criminal is no longer fit to 
live upon the earth, but is to be exterminated as a monster and a bane to 
human society.”16 
2. Taking Disenfranchisement to America 
English colonists brought the tradition of civil death with them to 
America.
17
  As time passed and colonies began to adjust the old common 
law to meet their own needs, many of the deprivations that attached with 
civil death were discarded.
18
  Disenfranchisement for criminal activity, 
however, remained firmly established in early American law.  In the pre-
Revolution colonies, even established citizens could lose their “freeman” 
status if they exhibited behavior characterized as “grossly scandalouse, or 
notoriously vitious.”19  While some colonies merely indicated that 
misbehavior would result in general loss of freedom, others more directly 
targeted voting.
20
  In Connecticut, for example, a freeman who had been 
 
14 Ewald, supra note 9, at 1060.  Ewald notes that the English infliction of “civil death” 
was reserved for a small number of very serious crimes and had to be implemented by 
judicial pronouncement.  Id. at 1060–61. 
15 Angela Behrens, Note, Voting—Not Quite a Fundamental Right? A Look at Legal and 
Legislative Challenges to Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 231, 236 
(2004) (quoting Howard Itzkowitz & Lauren Oldak, Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender’s Right 
to Vote: Background and Developments, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 726–27 (1973)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Behrens notes that an imposition of civil death was an alternative, 
rather than an addition, to other forms of public punishment, such as hanging and mutilation.  
Id. at 236 n.30. 
16 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *373. 
17 William Walton Liles, Commentary, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: 
Past, Present, and Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615, 617 (2007). 
18 For example, as the criminal code evolved in the early colonies, many of the civil 
prohibitions—e.g., inability to enter into contracts, inability to own property—were 
eliminated.  See id. 
19 Cortlandt F. Bishop, History of Elections in the American Colonies, in 3 STUDIES IN 
HISTORY ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW 1, 55 (Univ. Faculty of Political Sci. of Columbia 
Coll. ed., 1893). 
20 Id. 
2012] CIVIL DEATH IS DIFFERENT 445 
“scandalous” was disenfranchised until “good behaviour shall cause 
restoration of the privilege.”21  The Code of 1650 similarly dictated that: 
if any person within these Libberties haue beene or shall be fyned or whipped for any 
scandalous offence, hee shall not bee admitted after such time to haue any voate in the 
Towne or Commonwealth, nor to serue in the Jury, vntill the Courte shall manifest 
theire satisfaction.
22
   
Massachusetts explicitly announced that disenfranchisement was to be 
imposed for “fornication or any shamefull and vitious crime” or “any evill 
carriage agnt ye gouernments or churches.”23  Yet, while most of these laws 
conferred substantial discretion as to when suffrage could be regained, few 
envisioned permanent deprivation.
24
  Those laws that did call for lifetime 
disenfranchisement generally only allowed it after a conviction for an 
offense closely related to the exercise of the franchise itself.
25
 
The drafters of these early provisions and the governmental bodies in 
charge of their enforcement did not specify the purpose of the 
disenfranchisement penalties.
26
  These laws might simply be viewed as the 
direct descendants of their English forefathers, unquestionably penal in 
nature and used to punish and deter criminal behavior.
27
  On the other hand, 
the original unamended Constitution did not protect any voting rights,
28
 
except requiring an election for candidates to the House of 
Representatives
29
 and allowing states to dictate the time, place, and manner 
for holding elections for congressional representatives.
30
  These two clauses 
taken together suggest that access to the ballot box followed the theme of 
early American law: the Founding Fathers conferred to the states plenary 
 
21 Id. (quoting ACTS AND LAWS OF HIS MAGESTIE’S COLONY OF CONNECTICUT IN NEW 
ENGLAND 40 (1702)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
22 Id. (quoting 1 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT 559 (J. Hammond 
Trumble ed., 1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
23 Id. at 55–56 (quoting MASSACHUSETTS COLONIAL RECORDS, pt. II, 562, 110) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
24 Ewald, supra note 9, at 1062.  While some smaller communities within the colonies, 
like Plymouth, imposed permanent disenfranchisement, few required it for the entire colony.  
Instead, colonies like Massachusetts and Connecticut left the decision of when to restore 
voting rights to the court.  Id. 
25 Id.  Ewald notes that in Rhode Island, lifetime disenfranchisement was only triggered 
once a person was convicted of bribing an election official or of possessing a false deed 
(since owning property was at the time a prerequisite to ballot access).  Id. 
26 Thompson, supra note 8, at 173. 
27 Id. 
28 See John R. Cosgrove, Four New Arguments Against the Constitutionality of Felony 
Disenfranchisement, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 157, 165 (2004). 
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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Indeed, a quick survey of early American history sheds some light on 
what concept of suffrage the Framers had in mind.  John Adams and James 
Madison supported granting the franchise to only white landowning males, 
worrying that universal white suffrage might allow “the rights of property 
or the claims of justice . . . [to] be overruled by a majority without property, 
or interested in measures of justice.”32  Even Thomas Jefferson and Daniel 
Webster, whose visions of suffrage were more expansive, called for the 
suffrage of men who in some way affirmatively contributed to the 
government through ownership of property, participation in the army, or by 
paying taxes.
33
  These views of suffrage saw voting as a privilege rather 
than a right, and it is altogether possible that the Framers intended to leave 
the matter of voter qualifications entirely to the states.  It is no surprise 
then, that eighteenth-century America extended the franchise to property-
owning white males alone.
34
 
As notions of political equality developed in the United States, 
however, access to the ballot box began to expand.
35
  In the early nineteenth 
century, land ownership requirements fell away and were replaced by less 
onerous poll taxes.
36
  In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, 
welcoming black men to the franchise.
37
  In 1920, women were added to the 
voting rolls.
38
  In 1964, the poll tax was abolished,
39
 and in 1971, the United 




31 See S. Brannon Latimer, Can Felon Disenfranchisement Survive Under Modern 
Conceptions of Voting Rights?: Political Philosophy, State Interests, and Scholarly Scorn, 
59 SMU L. REV. 1841, 1842 (2006). 
32 James Madison, Note to his Speech on the Right of Suffrage, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 450, 450 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
33 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in POLITICAL 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 210, 212 (Joyce Appleby & Terence Ball eds., 1999). 
34 Latimer, supra note 31, at 1842. 
35 Id. at 1842–43. 
36 Id. at 1842. 
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1. 
39 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
40 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.  Interestingly, Pamela Karlan has argued that the 
extension of the voting franchise to new groups has been influenced by the United States’ 
engagements in war.  Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the 
Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2003).  According to Karlan, participation in a 
war effort, either by fighting directly or contributing at home, strengthens the affected 
group’s claim to full participation in democratic government.  Id. 
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Yet even as the voting rolls have become more diverse, there is one 
group whose claim to nationwide suffrage continues to be ignored: felons.  
Contrary to the general trend of expansion, felon disenfranchisement 
actually gained momentum in the early years of American history.
41
  In 
1840, only four of the existing twenty-four states had codified felon 
disenfranchisement schemes,
42
 but by “the eve of the Civil War, some two 
dozen states had statutes barring felons from voting or had . . . [similar] 
provisions in their state constitutions.”43  This change increased its speed in 
the years immediately following the Civil War.
44
  By 1870, twenty-eight of 
the thirty-eight states deprived citizens of the vote based on a felony 
conviction.
45
  Many have noted that this increase is largely due to the fact 
that southern states used criminal disenfranchisement provisions to prohibit 




In addition to the increase in the number of states that enacted 
disenfranchisement provisions during this time, the nature of those 
provisions also changed.
47
  Rather than limiting the penalty to offenders 
who committed a discrete group of crimes relevant to the exercise of the 
franchise, states began to enact much broader provisions.
48
  These 
provisions took a harsh tone, requiring an executive pardon to be returned 
to suffrage if they provided for a return at all.
49
 
It was not until the 1950s that advocates began to challenge felon 
disenfranchisement schemes, as part of a wider agenda to change the focus 
of the American penal system from retribution to rehabilitation and 
 
41 Manza & Uggen, supra note 6, at 492. 
42 Id. 
43 Liles, supra note 17, at 617 (quoting Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic 
Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 
AM. SOC. REV. 777, 781 (2002)). 
44 Behrens, supra note 15, at 237. 
45 Id. 
46 See, e.g., Ewald, supra note 9, at 1065 (noting that “several Southern states carefully 
re-wrote their criminal disenfranchisement provisions with the express intent of excluding 
blacks from the suffrage”); Latimer, supra note 31, at 1843 (explaining the various ways that 
“Southern Democrats erected . . . barriers to black suffrage” after the ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 542 
(1993) (recognizing that “scholars widely acknowledge the historically racist motives 
underlying criminal disenfranchisement”). 
47 Behrens, supra note 15, at 237. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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resocialization of offenders who successfully served out their sentences.
50
  
Advocates saw criminal disenfranchisement provisions as a collateral 
sentencing consequence that excluded offenders from society and increased 
their likelihood of recidivism.
51
  Given that these provisions disenfranchised 
an expressly defined group—individuals who had committed some 
offense—advocates first alleged violations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee that all people would receive “equal protection of 
the laws.”52 
B. FALLEN BRETHREN: PAST LEGAL CHALLENGES 
In the 1960s, the Warren Court handed down a series of decisions 
establishing the right to vote as “fundamental . . . in a free and democratic 
society.”53  Access to the ballot box, the Court explained, “is a fundamental 
political right, because [it is] preservative of all rights.”54  The Court thus 
required that any restriction of that right “must meet close constitutional 
scrutiny.”55 
Citing these cases, former inmates brought actions challenging state 
disenfranchisement laws, arguing that the laws deprived them of the right to 
vote protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
56
  Although these suits were initially successful,
57
 courts were 
 
50 Demleitner, supra note 7, at 766.  The challenge came from a “broad alliance” of 
unusual groups, including the National Conference on Uniform State Laws, the American 
Law Institute, the National Probation and Parole Association, the National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, and the President’s Commission on 
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.  Id. 
51 Id.; see also Latimer, supra note 31, at 1845–46. 
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
53 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).  Professor John Hart Ely has 
defended the Warren Court’s one person, one vote standard against criticism by arguing that 
the Republican Form Clause (Section Four of Article IV), when read together with the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutional amendments 
further extending the franchise, supports the conclusion that all qualified citizens should play 
a role in elections.  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 121–23 (1980). 
54 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). 
55 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).  The Dunn Court held that laws 
affecting the right to vote, like other laws implicating fundamental rights, must assert a 
compelling government interest and be “tailored to serve their legitimate objectives.”  Id. at 
343.  In approaching such an analysis, the Court stated that it gives no deference to state 
legislators when confronting a challenge to a citizen’s ability to participate in the franchise.  
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969).  
56 See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451–52 (2d Cir. 1967); Fincher v. 
Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 118–19 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff’d, 411 U.S. 961 (1973); Stephens v. 
Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1184–85 (D.N.J. 1970). 
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generally reluctant to strike down felon disenfranchisement laws under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
58
  In Green v. Board of Elections, the Second 
Circuit dismissed the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment59 and Fourteenth 
Amendment challenges, citing John Locke and stating that “[a] man who 
breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make . . . could fairly have 
been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in further 
administering the compact.”60  The court found this social contract theory 
sufficient to satisfy a rational basis test, which the court ruled was the 
appropriate standard for the provision.
61
  The court also cited Section Two 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,
62
 concluding that Section One could not 
possibly outlaw an action explicitly permitted under Section Two.
63
 
District courts outside of the Second Circuit embraced the Green 
decision and quickly dismissed other challenges to criminal 
disenfranchisement laws on the grounds that Section Two of the Fourteenth 
Amendment conferred constitutional permission for such laws.
64
  Just two 
years after Green, a district court in Florida noted that “excluding felons 
 
57 Stephens, 327 F. Supp. at 1188 (finding that the state interest in protecting the “purity 
of the electoral process” was not related to the “totally irrational and inconsistent 
classification” used to disenfranchise in New Jersey). 
58 Green, 380 F.2d at 452; Fincher, 352 F. Supp. at 119; Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. 
Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 
1969), aff’d, 396 U.S. 12 (1969). 
59 See infra Part III for a more detailed analysis of the Green court’s holding that felon 
disenfranchisement laws do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
60 Green, 380 F.2d at 451. 
61 Id. at 451–52. 
62 Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.  But 
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, 
or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced 
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, modified by U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1, and U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXVI, § 1 (emphasis added). 
63 Green, 380 F.2d at 452. 
64 Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 119 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff’d, 411 U.S. 961 (1973); 
Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 
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from the franchise has been so frequently recognized . . . that such 
expressions cannot be dismissed as unconsidered dicta.”65 
Lower courts’ reluctance to strike down felon disenfranchisement 
provisions under the Equal Protection Clause greatly intensified after 1974, 
when the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. Ramirez.
66
  Plaintiffs in 
Richardson challenged California’s disenfranchisement law67 on the 
grounds that it violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
68
  Plaintiffs argued that then-recent case law recognized the 
right to vote as fundamental and required any state law denying or 
inhibiting the exercise of the franchise to be narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling state interest.
69
  The California Supreme Court found for the 
plaintiffs, ruling that the state’s disenfranchisement provisions did not 
rationally serve its proffered interest in protecting against election fraud.
70
 
The Richardson Court disagreed and reversed.  Instead, the Court 
adopted the Second Circuit’s approach, finding that Section Two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provided an “affirmative sanction” of exclusion 
from the franchise; without this sanction, disenfranchisement would be 
vulnerable under the standard articulated by the earlier Warren Court in 
decisions such as Dunn and Kramer.
71
  Instead of declaring any standard of 
scrutiny for disenfranchisement laws, the Court implied that ex-offenders 
could be deprived of access to the ballot box in any way for any reason.
72
  




65 Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969), aff’d, 396 U.S. 12 
(1969). 
66 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
67 The California constitution at the time provided that “[l]aws shall be made to exclude 
from voting persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other 
high crimes” and that “no person convicted of any infamous crime . . . shall ever exercise the 
privileges of an elector in this State.”  CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 11, art. II, § 1. 
68 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 33. 
69 See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) (“Statutes affecting 
constitutional rights must be drawn with precision, and must be tailored to serve their 
legitimate objectives.” (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (“[I]f a challenged state statute grants 
the right to vote . . . to some otherwise qualified voters and denies it to others, the Court 
must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state 
interest.”); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (“Since the right to 
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil 
and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully 
and meticulously scrutinized.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
70 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 80 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 54; see cases cited supra note 69. 
72 See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.  
73 300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969), aff’d, 396 U.S. 12 (1969). 
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Supreme Court noted that it had already “strongly suggested in dicta that 
exclusion of convicted felons from the franchise violates no constitutional 
provision.”74 
Following Richardson, it seemed that the Supreme Court would not 
strike down any felon disenfranchisement scheme for any reason.  
However, in Hunter v. Underwood, Chief Justice Rehnquist—the author of 
the earlier Richardson decision—modified his position and ruled that a 
provision in the Alabama constitution disenfranchising those convicted of 
“crimes of moral turpitude” was unconstitutional.75  The two Hunter 
plaintiffs had both been convicted of presenting a worthless check, a 
misdemeanor in the state.
76
  The Court found that lawmakers had enacted 
the provision for the purpose of discriminating against African-Americans 
and further found that it did discriminate in effect, thereby violating the 
Equal Protection Clause.
77
  The Court retreated from its implication in 
Richardson that no felon disenfranchisement law could ever be found to 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
78
  Hunter declared that although 
depriving criminals as a group from access to the franchise is facially valid 
under the Equal Protection Clause, states may not discriminate against any 
protected class in the enactment or enforcement of such provisions.
79
 
The Supreme Court’s language in Hunter encouraged other plaintiffs 
to challenge various states’ disenfranchisement laws under a theory of 
intentional racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause 
and the Voting Rights Act.
80
  Like many other claims of intentional racial 




74 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 53 (citing Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 
U.S. 45, 79 (1959)).  But see Cosgrove, supra note 28, at 170 (arguing that but for Section 
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, felon disenfranchisement schemes would be invalid 
under the modern Fourteenth Amendment voting rights cases). 
75 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985). 
76 Id. at 224. 
77 Id. at 233. 
78 See id. 
79 Id. at 233.  
80 See, e.g., Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that an 
amendment to a state constitution removed the “taint” from the original version adopted to 
intentionally discriminate against blacks); see also Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 
1214, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (same); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 
(6th Cir. 1986) (finding no discriminatory intent in the enactment of Tennessee’s 
disenfranchisement statute). 
81 See supra, note 80.  Although the Supreme Court has never addressed a challenge to 
felon disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act, all circuit courts that have addressed 
the question have denied the claim.  Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc); Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 41 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
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II. FITTING A NEW FRAMEWORK: CHALLENGING FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Previous challenges alleging intentional discrimination under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Voting Rights Act failed because, despite 
being presented with overwhelming evidence of racially disparate 
treatment, courts refused to find discriminatory animus by the state against 
the individual plaintiffs.
82
  The plaintiffs mentioned above likewise failed to 
conceptualize disenfranchisement provisions as barbaric, and contrary to 
Trop v. Dulles and modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requiring 
punishments to adhere to “evolving standards of decency.”83  Instead, a 
more viable attack on felon disenfranchisement provisions could rely on the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments.84 
There is an existing precedent for a movement to litigate under the 
Eighth Amendment when the courts have ruled the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not apply: the most famous source of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the death penalty.
85
  Although civil rights groups in the 
1950s and 1960s enjoyed moderate success in the courts when challenging 
 
412 (2010); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 323 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc); Johnson, 405 
F.3d at 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1261 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that a history of racial discrimination cannot “condemn action that is not in itself 
unlawful” under the Voting Rights Act (internal quotations omitted)).  
82 In Johnson, the plaintiffs produced a wealth of evidence regarding the history of 
disenfranchisement in Florida.  Brief of Plaintiffs–Appellants at 5–16, Johnson v. Governor 
of Fla., 2004 WL 5467042 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (No. 02-14469C).  Their evidence and 
arguments traced the presence of discrimination from 1868, when Florida’s first 
disenfranchisement provision was adopted to “discriminate[] against the newly freed slaves 
and severely dilute[] their votes,” id. at 8, to the present use of the clemency process in the 
state to exacerbate racial disparities, id. at 13 (“In 2000, African Americans were 43.3% of 
the 9,750 applicants for restoration without a hearing, but only 29.2% of those determined 
eligible and only 25.3% of those whose civil rights were ultimately restored.”).  At the trial 
level, plaintiffs introduced the testimony of numerous experts, virtually all of whom testified 
about the racial effects of Florida’s disenfranchisement provision.  See Plaintiffs’ 
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Clemency Board Members’ Motion to 
Exclude Plaintiffs’ Witnesses and Evidence Identified Out-Of-Time at 1–3, Johnson v. Bush, 
2002 WL 32495085 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (No. 00-3542-CIV).  Incredibly, the plaintiff in Cotton 
litigated his claim pro se from prison.  Appellants, Pro Se, Brief at 1, Cotton v. Fordice, 1997 
WL 33485007 (5th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-60275).  Despite his incarceration, he nevertheless 
presented the circuit court with a detailed history of racism in Mississippi and its connection 
to the state’s disenfranchisement provision.  Id. at 27–32.  Indeed, the plaintiff’s evidence 
was so strong that both the defendant and the court conceded that Mississippi’s 
disenfranchisement provision was enacted for the purpose of discriminating against African-
Americans.  Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d at 391. 
83 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
84 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
85 STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY 247 (2003). 
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blatantly discriminatory laws under the Fourteenth Amendment,
86
 they were 
altogether unsuccessful at challenging the death penalty under the Equal 
Protection Clause.
87
  Then, in a dissent from the denial of certiorari in 
Rudolph v. Alabama,
88
 Justice Arthur Goldberg proposed that the death 




Reacting to Goldberg’s dissent, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund 
(LDF) abandoned its Fourteenth Amendment approach and co-opted the 
Eighth Amendment challenge.
90
  After winning a series of cases with 
narrow holdings,
91
 LDF’s broader argument carried the day in Furman v. 
Georgia, where the Supreme Court held Georgia’s death penalty 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
92
  LDF’s argument—that 
the rareness of the death penalty made the selection of eligible defendants 
“arbitrary”—allowed some Justices in the majority to voice their concerns 
about the discrimination present in the application of the death penalty, 
even when those concerns were not based on intentional discrimination as 




86 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1953) (holding that restrictive covenants 
segregating neighborhoods by race violated the Equal Protection Clause); McLaurin v. Okla. 
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) (finding a state law that provided different graduate 
education for students based on race invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
87 Rudolph v. State, 152 So. 2d 662, 666 (Ala. 1963) (refusing to take judicial notice of 
the discrimination present in the imposition of death sentences between black and white 
defendants); State ex rel. Johnson v. Mayo, 69 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 1954) (ruling that 
statistics showing a disparity in imposing the death sentence between black and white 
defendants did not prove acts of discrimination); Williams v. State, 335 S.W.2d 224, 225–26 
(Tex. 1960) (upholding the defendant’s sentence of death despite statistical evidence 
showing the disparity in death sentences); Hampton v. Commonwealth, 58 S.E.2d 288, 298 
(Va. 1950) (finding “not a scintilla of evidence” to support defendants’ claim of 
discrimination). 
88 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
89 Id. at 890 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
90 BANNER, supra note 85, at 252. 
91 See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521–22 (1968) (ruling that a state 
cannot exclude jurors for expressing general objections to the death penalty); United States 
v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 (1968) (striking down the capital punishment clause of the 
Federal Kidnapping Act as unconstitutional). 
92 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam).  Furman was a 5-4 decision and all 9 justices 
on the Court wrote separate opinions.  Id. 
93 BANNER, supra note 85, at 269.  For example, Justice Douglas wrote in his 
concurrence that “[i]n several instances where a white and a Negro were co-defendants, the 
white was sentenced to life imprisonment or a term of years, and the Negro was given the 
death penalty.”  Furman, 408 U.S. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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Indeed, the core value embodied by the Eighth Amendment makes it a 
more appropriate avenue for a constitutional challenge to felon 
disenfranchisement.  From the beginning of modern Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court has said that the ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment has a prospective scope and “may acquire meaning as public 
opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”94  In Trop v. Dulles, the 
seminal Eighth Amendment case, the Court announced that the Amendment 
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.”95  The Trop Court envisioned the 
Eighth Amendment as evolutionary, where a form of punishment once 
unquestioned might be viewed by future generations as outside the limits of 
civilized standards and constitutionally impermissible.
96
  By contrast, the 
Equal Protection Clause generally requires a plaintiff to show that the state 
intended to engage in invidious discrimination when it first acted in the 
field.
97
  Once a court has ruled that the law’s creation was not tainted with a 
racially discriminatory purpose, stare decisis demands that the ruling be 
respected unless it is proven unworkable.
98
 
Because of the prospective nature of the Trop decision,
99
 courts can 
feel freer to modify past rulings to adjust to current popular practices and 
opinions.
100
  Moreover, these modifications largely push judicial decisions 
one way: “as moral sentiments become more refined—as the frame of 
reference for humanity and compassion expands—the range of 
constitutionally permissible punishment diminishes.”101  The Supreme 
 
94 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (internal citations omitted). 
95 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (emphasis added). 
96 Id. at 100. 
97 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976).  The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
further require that a plaintiff must show not only that the state’s original legislative action 
was motivated by impermissible discrimination, but also that any amendment to or 
modification of that law was similarly adopted with discriminatory intent.  Johnson v. 
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1224 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Cotton v. Fordice, 157 
F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 1998).  
98 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
99 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
100 See William C. Heffernan, Constitutional Historicism: An Examination of the Eighth 
Amendment Evolving Standards of Decency Test, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1355, 1384 (2005). 
101 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).  The notable exception to this one-way street 
of Eighth Amendment interpretation is the death penalty (once again).  In Furman v. 
Georgia, the Court invalidated Georgia’s death penalty law, ruling that its “imposition . . . 
constitute[s] cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”  408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).  Four years later, however, the Court in Gregg 
v. Georgia upheld Troy Gregg’s sentence of death for a murder conviction.  428 U.S. 153, 
158, 207 (1976). 
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Court, recognizing the potential arbitrariness that might result from such a 
free-wheeling mandate, has attempted to rein in this power by looking for 
“objective evidence of contemporary values,” as evidenced by “legislation 
enacted by the country’s legislatures.”102  However, the Court 
simultaneously reserves the right to exercise its own judgment on what 
practices are cruel and unusual.
103
 
Past case law demonstrates that the Supreme Court is perhaps more 
willing to modify its earlier rulings in the context of Eighth Amendment 
litigation than any other constitutional challenge.  In Atkins v. Virginia,
104
 
the Court ruled that imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded 
criminals was cruel and unusual, directly overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, a 
case it decided just thirteen years earlier.
105
  Similarly, the Court announced 
in Roper v. Simmons
106
 that juveniles could no longer be constitutionally 
sentenced to death, reversing Stanford v. Kentucky,
107
 decided by the Court 
sixteen years earlier.
108
  Thus, when it comes to Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Court seems more willing to consider changing 
conditions and social attitudes, notwithstanding its own past statements 
regarding the legitimacy of a form of punishment, and question the 
punishment anew. 
It may seem surprising, then, that more scholars have not argued that 
the Eighth Amendment is the proper channel for a challenge to felon 
disenfranchisement schemes.
109
  However, given the quite recent 
 
102 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302, 331 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).  This “independent judgment,” though 
continually invoked by the Court, has never been used to strike down a form of punishment 
that did not meet the evolving standards comparison, using legislative action or popular 
opinion as evidence.  Heffernan, supra note 100, at 1380–81. 
104 Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
105 Penry, 492 U.S. at 322, 335 (holding that failure to instruct the jury that it could 
consider mitigating evidence of defendant’s mental retardation was cruel and unusual, but 
that sentencing a mentally retarded man to death, per se, was not), overruled by Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 314–15 (finding that “[m]uch has changed since [Penry],” including the fact that 
states post-Penry overwhelmingly provided additional protections for mentally retarded 
defendants facing the death penalty). 
106 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
107 492 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (ruling that because a majority of the states with capital 
punishment regimes allow defendants sixteen or older to face a possible sentence of death, 
the practice was not unusual and did not violate the Eighth Amendment). 
108 Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (finding a significant decrease in states allowing juveniles to 
be sentenced to death, although noting that this decrease was not as substantial as in Atkins). 
109 See, e.g., Cosgrove, supra note 28 (arguing that the language of Section Two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies only to male offenders and that the Nineteenth Amendment 
repealed this Section); Liles, supra note 17 (discussing the future of such challenges under 
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developments foreclosing the Voting Rights Act as a viable method to 
challenging these laws,
110
 and given the fact that until 2010, the Court’s 
main Eighth Amendment jurisprudence focused largely on the death 
penalty,
111
 a viable challenge construing felon disenfranchisement as cruel 
and unusual under the Eighth Amendment has seemed unlikely until now.  
In Rummel v. Estelle, the Court went so far as to say that “[o]utside the 
context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality 
of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.”112 
Then, in May 2010, the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida
113
 
and reconstrued the “death is different” jurisprudence into a more expansive 
 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act); Shapiro, supra note 46 (arguing that 
such challenges should be made under the Voting Rights Act).  But see Thompson, supra 
note 8, at 199–201 (advocating that felon disenfranchisement is cruel and unusual under 
Justice Brennan’s four principles espoused in Furman v. Georgia); Pamela A. Wilkins, The 
Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised Felons and the Constitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 85, 136–43 (2005) (exploring the possibility of an Eighth Amendment challenge to 
felon disenfranchisement).  
110 Indeed, until October 7, 2010, the Ninth Circuit maintained that the Voting Rights Act 
did preclude Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law, creating a circuit split on the issue.  
Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 990–91 (9th Cir. 2010). 
111 Considering all the Eighth Amendment challenges to defendants’ criminal sentences, 
it seems that since Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Supreme Court has been 
much more sympathetic to attacks on the death penalty.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
554 U.S. 407, 446–47 (2008) (finding it unconstitutional to sentence a defendant to death for 
the crime of rape of a child that did not result in death); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 
934–35 (2007) (ruling that criminals may not be executed if they are incapable of 
understanding the reason for their imminent execution); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding that 
juveniles may not be sentenced to death); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07 (2002) 
(stating that mentally retarded defendants may not be sentenced to death); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (finding it unconstitutional to sentence a defendant to 
death for aiding and abetting a felony wherein a murder is committed by others without any 
intent on the part of the defendant); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (ruling that 
a sentence of death for the rape of an adult woman was cruel and unusual). 
 By contrast, Eighth Amendment challenges to other criminal sentences as 
disproportionate to the crime largely fail.  See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 
(2003) (holding that California’s three strikes law was not cruel and unusual); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995–96 (1991) (finding that although a sentence to life without 
parole for a first-time offender may be cruel, it is not unusual and therefore does not violate 
the Eighth Amendment); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283–84 (1980) (ruling that a 
mandatory life sentence following a defendant’s third felony conviction, this time for 
obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses, was not cruel and unusual).  The sole exception to this 
peculiar history is Solem v. Helm, where the Court ruled that a sentence of life without parole 
for the crime of writing a check from a fake account did constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.  463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). 
112 Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272. 
113 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
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view of the Eighth Amendment.
114
  The Court ruled that juvenile offenders 
who have been convicted of non-homicidal crimes may not be sentenced to 
life without the possibility of parole.  For the first time in the Court’s 
history, it created a categorical exclusion under the Eighth Amendment that 
did not involve the penalty of death.
115
  The Court reinvigorated Trop’s 
“precept[s] of justice” and “evolving standards of decency” language, 
applying it outside of the capital punishment context.
116
 
Most notably, the Graham Court recharacterized the distinction 
between a “gross proportionality” analysis and a categorical exclusion 
analysis.
117
  Previously, most courts had applied the gross proportionality 
analysis to all sentences not implicating the death penalty.
118
  This analysis 
“does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence” and 
“forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the 
crime.”119  The gross proportionality analysis is heavily fact-centered, 
taking into account all of the circumstances of the case at hand and 
inquiring whether the exact punishment imposed is excessive.
120
  
Challenges in cases analyzed under the “gross proportionality” requirement 
are widely unsuccessful and, even when the offender does prevail, so fact-
specific that they rarely apply outside of the instant case.
121
  In fact, there 
have been just three instances where the Supreme Court has found the 
punishment in question cruel and unusual under a gross proportionality 
analysis, and none since 1983.
122
 
The Graham Court, however, construed the challenged punishment as 
part of a larger categorical challenge and subjected it to a much more 
 
114 See generally Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011.  Commentators have credited the origin of 
the “death is different” phrase to Justice Stewart, who wrote in his concurring opinion in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring), that “[t]he penalty of 
death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment . . . .”  See, e.g., Daniel Ross 
Harris, Note, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A Retreat from the “Death Is 
Different” Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1389, 1390 n.7 (1991); Rory K. Little, The Federal 
Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 364 n.79 (1999).  
115 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023. 
116 Id. at 2021. 
117 Id. at 2022. 
118 See Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Commentary, Redemption Song: Graham v. 
Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSION 86, 87 (2010). 
119 Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (internal quotation omitted). 
120 See Smith & Cohen, supra note 118, at 87. 
121 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). 
122 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); 
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
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searching analysis.
123
  Under the modified categorical exclusion analysis, 
the Court asked whether the general punishment in question (life without 
the possibility of parole) was permissibly imposed on the offenders in 
question (juveniles convicted of non-homicidal crimes).
124
  Having framed 
the issue, the Court employed the standards used in previous death penalty 
cases.   
Smith and Cohen observe that, whether or not this move by the Court 
was wise, the characterization “appears poised to stay.”125  Thus, the next 
portion of this Comment follows the steps of analysis articulated by the 
Graham Court and shows how one state’s felon disenfranchisement scheme 
might successfully be challenged by arguing that it imposes cruel and 
unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 
III. A LIFE SENTENCE: CHALLENGING VIRGINIA’S DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
PROVISION AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
Generally speaking, when courts confront Eighth Amendment 
challenges to a state practice or law, they typically take most seriously 
challenges to the most draconian or extreme form of that practice.  In the 
context of the juvenile justice system, advocates first worked to exempt 
juveniles from the death penalty
126
 before challenging their sentences of life 
without the possibility of parole for non-homicidal crimes.
127
  As Smith and 
Cohen note, it was the convergence of reasoning in Roper
128
 and Kennedy v. 
Louisiana
129
 that allowed the Court in Graham to find a constitutional 
violation.
130
  In other words, but for Roper, there would be no Graham.
131
 
In the context of disenfranchisement, attacking the practice wholesale 
will likely result in immediate dismissal from most courts.
132
  Instead, a 
 
123 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010).  Justices Thomas and Scalia noted 
the Court’s innovation and departure from the “death is different” distinction, declaring it 
“especially mystifying when one considers how long it has resisted crossing that divide.”  Id. 
at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
124 Id. at 2039 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
125 Smith & Cohen, supra note 118, at 89. 
126 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
127 Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011. 
128 Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
129 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
130 Smith & Cohen, supra note 118, at 91–92. 
131 Id. 
132 There are several reasons, both practical and legal, why a court would not take such a 
challenge seriously.  In its broadest form, forty-eight states deprive some felons of the right 
to vote for some period of time.  See infra Part III.C.  Most courts that have addressed an 
Eighth Amendment challenge to felon disenfranchisement wholesale have given it short 
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serious challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws will begin with the most 





  For reasons explained in Part B, this 
Comment’s analysis of the Graham test will focus on the sweeping 
disenfranchisement provision found in the Virginia constitution. 
A. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION ANALYSIS 
Before a court will analyze a state or federal law for Eighth 
Amendment violations, petitioners must clear a threshold hurdle: they must 
establish that the law in question is indeed punishment and not merely a 
regulation.
137
  If the court finds a law to be merely a regulation of the field, 
this ends the Eighth Amendment inquiry, as its focus is punishments.
138
 
If a petitioner successfully persuades a court that the 
disenfranchisement provision is indeed punitive, he or she must satisfy 
every step of the categorical exclusion analysis.  Under the categorical 
exclusion analysis articulated by the Graham Court, a court considering any 
challenge to a category of punishment must first consider the “objective 
indicia of society’s standards.”139  In so doing, it will conduct a survey of 
state legislation and sentencing practices to determine whether a “national 
consensus against the sentencing practice at issue” exists.140 
Next, a court must make its own independent judicial determination as 
to whether the punishment is prohibited under the Eighth Amendment, 
using the provision’s “text, history, meaning, and purpose.”141  In the 
context of felon disenfranchisement, the court should: (a) consider the 
offender’s characteristics to determine whether the particular class of 
offenders in question has some common characteristic rendering those 
offenders less deserving of punishment than offenders at large, and (b) 
 
shrift, disposing of the claim quickly.  See, e.g., Theiss v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws 
of Md., 387 F. Supp. 1038, 1041–42 (D. Md. 1974); Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 119 
(M.D.N.C. 1972); Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 
133 IOWA CONST. art. II, § 5.  
134 FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.  
135 KY. CONST. § 145. 
136 VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.  See Erika Wood, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RESTORING THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE 3 (2d ed. 2009); see also Wendy R. Weiser & Lawrence Norden, BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTING LAW CHANGES IN 2012, at 34–36 (2011). 
137 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167–69 (1963). 
138 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93–94 (2003).  
139 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 563 (2005)). 
140 Id. at 2023. 
141 Id. at 2022 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008)). 
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analyze the nature of the offense to determine whether it is less deserving of 
punishment than other offenses punished in the same way.
142
  The court 
should also consider the nature of the punishment, to see how it compares 
against other possible punishments and the penological justification for it, 
to determine whether any legitimate justification exists.
143
  As to the last 
factor, if the court finds no legitimate penal objective, the sentence in 
question “is by its nature disproportionate to the offense” and must be 
invalidated under the Eighth Amendment.
144
 
Finally, the court may look to how the practices of the punishment 
within the United States compare to the practices within other countries 
around the world.
145
  Although the Graham Court did look to international 
sentencing practices to support its finding,
146
 an international comparison 
can only lend support and should not itself be considered dispositive on the 
issue of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.
147
 
B. LIFETIME FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IS PUNITIVE AND NOT 
REGULATORY 
As a threshold issue, a party bringing a claim against felon 
disenfranchisement must establish that the law in question is punitive in 
order to invoke the protections of the Eighth Amendment.
148
 
In Trop v. Dulles, the Court mentioned in passing that unlike the 
revocation of citizenship, where the effects are so drastic that it can only be 
punitive in nature, revocation of access to the voting franchise might 
 
142 Id. at 2026–27. 
143 Id. at 2026–28. 
144 Id. at 2028. 
145 Id. at 2033–34. 
146 Id. 
147 The debate over the appropriate role that international law should play in American 
constitutional jurisprudence is far outside the bounds of this Comment.  Suffice it to say that 
Justice Thomas notes his bitter disagreement with the majority’s choice to employ 
comparisons with foreign jurisdictions, “confining to a footnote” his belief that “such factors 
are irrelevant to the meaning of our Constitution or the Court’s discernment of any 
longstanding tradition in this nation.”  Id. at 2053 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
148 In Smith v. Doe, the Court explained how it distinguished between regulatory and 
punitive schemes: 
If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry.  If, however, 
the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further 
examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the 
state’s] intention to deem it civil.  Because we ordinarily defer to the legislature’s stated intent, 
only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been 
denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. 
538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003). 
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legitimately “designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting,” and 
could thus be sustained as a “nonpenal exercise of the power to regulate the 
franchise.”149  Although this statement was dicta and posed as a simple 
hypothetical,
150
 the Court gave it more force in Lassiter v. Northampton 
County Board of Elections, when it stated that “[r]esidence requirements, 
age, [and] previous criminal record are obvious examples indicating factors 
which a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications 
of voters.”151  These statements, taken together, have been enough to 
convince some courts that felon disenfranchisement is regulatory, not 




However, given subsequent developments in conceptions of the right 
to vote, Professor Pamela Karlan argues that these prior decisions were 
based on an outdated understanding that states had plenary power to 
regulate the franchise, including regulating by disqualifying those who were 
“practically hostile” to established moral values.153  The Court repudiated 
the “hostility to moral values” view in Carrington v. Rash, striking down 
laws that denied the right to vote to “persons advocating a certain 
practice.”154 
But arguing the inapplicability of the statements in Trop and Lassiter 
in the face of Carrington will at best create a blank slate as to the regulatory 
or punitive function of felon disenfranchisement laws.  Further proof that 
the disenfranchisement provision is punitive must still be given.  To that 
end, the Reconstruction Act of 1870
155
 provides forceful evidence that 
Virginia’s constitutional provision disenfranchising felons must be punitive. 
The Reconstruction Act of 1870 was one of four acts passed to readmit 
the eleven ex-Confederate states into the Union.
156
  The Act requires: 
 
149 356 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1959). 
150 Wilkins, supra note 109, at 102 (“[T]he Court invoked a hypothetical statute from a 
hypothetical jurisdiction, then assumed (without examining the history of the hypothetical 
statute or of disenfranchisement practices in the hypothetical jurisdiction) that the 
hypothetical statute’s purpose was to regulate the franchise.”). 
151 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959). 
152 Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967); Beacham v. Braterman, 
300 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D. Fla. 1969), aff’d, 396 U.S. 12 (1969). 
153 Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the 
Debate of Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1150–51 (2004). 
154 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). 
155 Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 62.  
156 Act of Feb. 27, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat. 67 (readmitting Mississippi); 16 Stat. 62 
(readmitting Virginia); Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73 (readmitting North Carolina, 
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That the State of Virginia is admitted to representation in Congress as one of the 
States of the Union upon the following fundamental conditions: First, That the 
Constitution of Virginia shall never be so amended or changed as to deprive any 
citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to vote who are entitled to 
vote by the Constitution herein recognized, except as a punishment for such crimes as 
are now felonies at common law, whereof they shall have been duly convicted under 
laws equally applicable to all the inhabitants of said State.
157
 
The Virginia Constitution, including the felon disenfranchisement 
provision, was subsequently ratified in 1870.
158
  Therefore, the Act required 
that any disenfranchisement provision enacted in Virginia must be for the 
purpose of punishment,
159
 or else Virginia would, in effect, be violating the 
terms upon which it was readmitted into the Union. 
Invoking the Reconstruction Act as dispositive proof that Virginia’s 
lifetime felon disenfranchisement provision is punitive forces the state into 
a sort of catch-22.  If the state argues that its constitutional provision is 
merely regulatory, then the Act functions as an alteration made by Congress 
to a state’s federal election laws, as permitted by Article I, Section Four of 
the Constitution.
160
  If the state instead avoids this argument and does not 
 
South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida); Act of June 22, 1868, ch. 69, 15 
Stat. 72 (readmitting Arkansas). 
Florida’s Reconstruction Act, with language nearly identical to the one applicable to 
Virginia, may allow for a similar challenge to be brought against the state of Florida.  15 
Stat. 73.  However, Florida only recently began imposing lifetime disenfranchisement for all 
convicted felons.  David Ruppe, Florida Changes Controversial Voting Policy, ABC NEWS, 
Mar. 26, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=93730&page=1&singlePage=true
#.T0RQbXKXSs4. While the state constitution authorizes the state’s sweeping 
disenfranchisement provision, see FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4, the state had previously provided 
for automatic restoration of some individuals previously convicted of felonies.  See Ari 
Berman, The GOP War on Voting, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 15, 2011, at 49.  In March 2011, 
however, after just thirty minutes of public debate, Republican Governor Rick Scott 
overturned that streamlined process.  Id. (noting that the change instantly disenfranchised 
97,491 individuals and precluded another 1.1 million individuals from being allowed to vote 
after completing their sentences).  Given the infancy of the state’s disenfranchisement 
provision, as well as the special attention given to the issue in Florida (the state’s application 
of its disenfranchisement provision became a controversial issue during the 2000 
Presidential election), this Comment will not address how such an alternative challenge 
might succeed. 
157 16 Stat. 62 (emphasis added). 
158 VA. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
159 See 16 Stat. 62.  The Act also requires that Virginia limit its disenfranchisement 
scheme to those crimes that were at the time “felonies at common law.”  Id.  This presents a 
strong alternative argument, but as it has no bearing on an Eighth Amendment claim, I will 
not address it here. 
160 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof, 
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challenge petitioner’s contention that the disenfranchisement provision is 
punitive, then no invocation of the Act is necessary and the analysis can 
move on to the next phase. 
One pre-Voting Rights Act case in Virginia casts doubt on the validity 
of the Reconstruction Act and is worth rebutting here.  In Butler v. 
Thompson, a black woman brought suit in federal court seeking an order to 
compel Virginia to register her as a voter despite her failure to pay the 
state’s poll tax.161  The court rejected her claim, questioning whether the 
state’s failure to comply with certain conditions was justiciable in the courts 
and whether the Act was even valid at all.
162
  The court suggested that the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Texas v. White, that the Confederate States were 
never legally outside the Union, obviated any need for readmission.
163
  
Finally, the court stated that the Act must not unduly restrict the election 
laws of Virginia in order to have any force, since “the constitutional duty of 
guaranteeing each state a republican form of government gives Congress no 
power in admitting a state to impose a restriction which would operate to 
deprive that state of equality with other states.”164 
In contrast, numerous federal courts have applied the Reconstruction 
Act of 1870 without mention of any genuine validity issues.
165
  The 
Supreme Court itself, in Richardson v. Ramirez, cited the Reconstruction 
Acts favorably.
166
  Second, the argument that Congress may not treat states 
unequally appears to have been answered when the Supreme Court, in 
Bartlett v. Strickland, upheld the constitutionality of Section Five of the 
Voting Rights Act, which requires federal approval for redistricting 
decisions in nine specified states.
167
 
Thus, it appears that the Reconstruction Act of 1870 is valid and does 
have force.  As such, its mandate that Virginia may only disenfranchise 
felons for a punitive purpose should be respected by a court, and section 
one of article II in the Virginia constitution should be construed as punitive. 
 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the 
Places of chusing Senators.”). 
161 Butler v. Thompson, 97 F. Supp. 17, 20–21 (E.D. Va. 1951). 
162 Id. at 19. 
163 Id. at 20 (citing Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 721 (1868)). 
164 Id. at 21 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 570 (1911)). 
165 E.g., Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Section 
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment was not limited to felonies at common law when it was 
ratified because where Congress wished to place such a limitation, it did so explicitly); 
Coronado v. Napolitano, No. CV 07-1089-PHX-SMM, 2008 WL 191987, at *8 (D. Ariz. 
Jan. 22, 2008) (same).  
166 418 U.S. 24, 49–51 (1974). 
167 556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
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C. OBJECTIVE INDICIA DEMONSTRATE A NATIONAL CONSENSUS 
AGAINST IMPOSING INDISCRIMINATE LIFETIME FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
Once a law is construed as punitive, the court may properly subject it 
to an Eighth Amendment analysis.  The Court, in Graham v. Florida, 
articulated that any categorical exclusion analysis must begin by 
establishing a “national consensus” through “objective evidence of . . . the 
legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”168  In the context of felon 
disenfranchisement, only four states—Iowa, Florida, Kentucky,169 and 
Virginia
170—now exclude individuals convicted at any time of any felony 
from the franchise for life.
171
  Although forty-eight states deprive some 
felons of the right to vote for some period of time, no other states provide 
the combination of permanency and breadth present in these four states’ 
constitutional provisions.
172
  Thirty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia currently allow felons to be re-enfranchised at least upon 
completion of their sentences; two states, Maine and Vermont, currently 
allow felons to vote even while they are incarcerated.
173
  The remaining 
seven states
174
 impose lifetime disenfranchisement upon conviction of 




However, as the Graham Court recognized, “[t]here are measures of 
consensus other than legislation,” such as actual sentencing practices.176  
Here, too, Virginia stands out as one of the most extreme examples of felon 
 
168 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022–23 (2010). 
169 KY. CONST. § 145. 
170 VA. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
171 Wood, supra note 136, at 3. 
172 Id. 
173 Of these thirty-seven states, five states (California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, 
and South Dakota) allow felons on probation to vote, and thirteen states (Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Utah) and the District of Columbia allow those on 
probation or parole to vote.  Id. 
174 The remaining seven states are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Mississippi, Nevada, 
Tennessee, and Wyoming.  Id. 
175 BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS ACROSS THE 
UNITED STATES 2–3, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_
48642.pdf.  See infra note 186 for a discussion of states that have recently abolished 
disenfranchisement schemes identical to those found in Kentucky and Virginia. 
176 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022–23 (2010) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
554 U.S. 407, 421–22 (2008)). 
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disenfranchisement.
177
  Virginia’s provision currently deprives 377,847 
residents, or 6.8% of its population, from access to the ballot box.
178
  In 
comparison, the only states with figures that exceed or approximate 
Virginia’s are Texas (which currently disenfranchises 522,887 individuals) 
and Florida (which currently disenfranchises 1,179,687 individuals).
179
  
While the raw number of disenfranchised individuals is greater in Texas 
than in Virginia, the Texas figure represents only 3.3% of the state’s 
population.
180
  Furthermore, Texas deprives its felons of access only while 
they are completing their sentences, and thus, most of those who currently 
cannot vote will regain suffrage at some point in the future.
181
 
Finally, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia
182
 and Roper v. Simmons
183
 
noted that another important factor in an Eighth Amendment analysis 
regarding the presence of a “national consensus” is the history and 
substance of recent state action regarding the punishment in question.
184
  
Just as the Court in those decisions recognized the consistency of the 
direction of change in the state legislatures, here, too, there has been a 
largely one-way movement of states addressing their felon 
disenfranchisement provisions.
185
  In just a thirteen-year period from 1997 
to 2010, twenty-three states reformed their felon disenfranchisement laws in 
various ways to make the franchise more accessible to ex-felons.
186
  As the 
Atkins Court observed, “[g]iven the well-known fact that anticrime 
legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for 
persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting . . . 
[the punishment in question] provides powerful evidence that today our 
society[’s] views” have changed.187  Moreover, there is direct evidence that 
 
177 SENTENCING PROJECT, INTERACTIVE MAP, http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/





182 536 U.S. 304, 314 (2002). 
183 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005). 
184 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–16. 
185 NICOLE D. PORTER, SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: STATE FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM, 1997–2010, at 4–5 (2010), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/vr_ExpandingtheVoteFinal
Addendum.pdf. 
186 Id.  For example, nine states either abandoned or modified lifetime 
disenfranchisement laws, including Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Maryland, Nebraska, 
and New Mexico.  Id.  Eight more simplified their restoration processes for qualified people 
seeking to have their voting rights restored.  Id. at 1. 
187 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315–16. 
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the population at large disapproves of lifetime disenfranchisement.  
According to a poll conducted by the Center for Survey Research and 




All of this evidence indicates that in the context of a challenge to 
Virginia’s lifetime disenfranchisement provision, a national consensus has 
emerged against the imposition of this punishment. 
D. LIFETIME DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF ALL FELONS HAS NO 
LEGITIMATE PUNITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS 
However, the Graham Court stressed that a national consensus would 
not itself determine the standards of what constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment, stating that “the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
remains [the judiciary’s] responsibility.”189  Under this analysis, the Court 
will examine the nature of the offender, the offense, and the punishment all 
separately and comparatively.
190
  Because felons as a general group do not 
evoke the kind of sympathy that other groups like juveniles or the mentally 
handicapped do, and because the set of felonies in Virginia encompasses 
everything from possession of a certain amount of marijuana
191
 to 
premeditated murder, it is unlikely that presenting the general group as 
somehow having less culpability would succeed.
192
 
However, the court will also consider separately whether the 
punishment serves legitimate penal goals.
193
  In the context of a claim 
against Virginia’s disenfranchisement provision, petitioners will have to 
show that the state’s law does not serve any of the four traditional 





188 See also PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., OPEN SOC’Y INST., CHANGING 
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 14 
(2002), available at http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/Hart-Poll.pdf (finding that 68% 
of respondents “strongly favor” or “somewhat favor” reenfranchising people with felony 
convictions after they are released from prison). 
189 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010). 
190 Id. 
191 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-9 to -11 (2009).  
192 In Graham, petitioners were able to present a group of sympathetic plaintiffs 
(juveniles) being subjected to the second-worst punishment available (life in prison without 
the possibility of parole) for a group of crimes that specifically excluded the worst (non-
homicide offenses).  Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–28. 
193 Id. at 2026. 
194 Id. at 2028–30 (noting that “[a] sentence lacking any penological justification is by its 
nature disproportionate to the offense” and therefore unconstitutional). 
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It is clear that any lifetime felon disenfranchisement cannot serve 
legitimate rehabilitative ends.  Similar to the sentence in Graham, a 
sentence of lifetime removal from suffrage “forswears altogether the 
rehabilitative ideal.”195  The Court in Graham suggested that a decision that 
characterizes a group irredeemable and deprives them of the option of 
redemption would be met with suspicion.
196
 
Nor can lifetime disenfranchisement be justified under a theory of 
incapacitation.  Overall, it is unlikely that anyone would seriously argue 
that depriving a felon of the right to vote somehow will prevent her from 
committing some future criminal offense unrelated to voting.
197
  Yet, the 
real effect of this penological justification draws on the moral desire to 
protect the purity of the ballot box.
198
  Even in the context of voting, this 
justification carries no weight.
199
  As Karlan discusses, the actual 
occurrence of voting fraud is low and rarely determinative in an election.
200
  
Moreover, when analyzing how many of those convicted of voting fraud 
have previously been convicted of a felony, the number dwindles to nearly 
zero.
201
  Due to the technological advances in the way citizens vote, it is 
likely that election fraud may no longer pose a serious danger.
202
  
Furthermore, even if election fraud is a sufficient danger to warrant 
disenfranchisement, Virginia’s provision disenfranchising all felons 
regardless of the crime reaches much further than necessary to prevent any 
fraud.
203
  Indeed, the disconnect becomes apparent when comparing an 
individual convicted of possessing a large amount of marijuana, who is 
disenfranchised for life, with an individual convicted of a fraud-related 
crime, who will not lose his vote if the fraud was a misdemeanor. 
Like the argument for incapacitation, the argument for lifetime 
disenfranchisement under a deterrence theory generally falls flat.
204
  
Realistically, it is unlikely that a would-be criminal, undeterred by the 
threat of long-term incarceration, limited freedom afterward on parole, and 
 
195 Id. at 2030. 
196 See id.; see also Smith & Cohen, supra note 118, at 93. 
197 See Karlan, supra note 153, at 1167. 
198 See Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and “The 
Purity of the Ballot Box,” 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1314 (1989). 
199 Karlan, supra note 153, at 1167. 
200 Id. at 1169. 
201 Id. at 1167. 
202 Thompson, supra note 8, at 190. 
203 Id. 
204 Karlan, supra note 153, at 1166. 
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the imposition of fines, would choose to abstain from crime based solely on 
the prospect that he would lose his ability to vote.
205
 
Thus, the only justification for lifetime disenfranchisement is under a 
retributive theory.
206
  However, the Graham Court is careful to note that 
while retribution is a legitimate reason to punish, “the heart of the 
retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to 
the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”207  As Professor Karlan 
has observed, “[a] categorical disenfranchisement of all ex-offenders 
convicted of a felony lumps together crimes of vastly different gravity,” and 
thus offenders without a high degree of blameworthy conduct, such as mere 
possession of cocaine,
208
 are given the same punishment with the same 
justification as offenders with the highest degree of blameworthy conduct, 
such as those convicted of murder.
209
  Although no precise degree of 
proportionality is required under an Eighth Amendment analysis, it is likely 
that a court will find that the complete lack of any proportionality renders 
Virginia’s disenfranchisement provision invalid under a retributive 
penological justification. 
E. WHEN COMPARED AGAINST INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES, 
VIRGINIA’S LIFETIME DISENFRANCHISEMENT PROVISION FOR 
ALL FELONIES APPEARS EVEN MORE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 
The Court in Graham looked to the international community to 
evaluate the cruelty and unusualness of Florida’s sentencing practice.210  
The Court insisted, however, that “[t]he judgments of other nations and the 
international community are not dispositive as to the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment,” but merely relevant in assessing how far-reaching the 
consensus is against the challenged punishment.
211
 
In the present case, the United States and Belgium are the only two 
countries among Western industrial nations to deny felons access to the 
 
205 Id.  Moreover, there is some evidence that suggests that disenfranchisement, when 
considered with other collateral consequences to conviction, actually increases the chances 
that a previously convicted individual will reoffend.  See Raymond Paternoster, How Much 
Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 820 
(2010) (arguing that obstacles to reentry, imposed because of the conviction, “decreas[e] the 
utility of non-offending” and explain the low deterrence effect of even long-term 
incarceration).  
206 Karlan, supra note 153, at 1166. 
207 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (citations omitted). 
208 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-255.2 (2009). 
209 Karlan, supra note 153, at 1167. 
210 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033. 
211 Id. 
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franchise for life.
212
  Furthermore, the United States is the only country that 
permits disenfranchisement based on a category as broad as “all 
felonies.”213  In the mid-1960s, most of Europe questioned the practice of 
disenfranchisement altogether, and several countries enacted reforms to 
allow felons greater access to the ballot.
214
  This movement has accelerated 
in recent years, as various courts have removed many limitations on the 
access to the ballot.
215
  As the Sentencing Project noted in its 2007 report, 
Barriers to Democracy, “The United States’ policy of criminal 
disenfranchisement is extreme by every metric, and there is compelling 
need for reform.”216 
The Court stated in Graham: 
the laws and practices of other nations and international agreements [are] relevant to 
the Eighth Amendment not because those norms are binding or controlling but 
because the judgment of the world’s nations that a particular sentencing practice is 
inconsistent with basic principles of decency demonstrates that the Court’s rationale 
has respected reasoning to support it.
217
   
In the present context, we see how out of step Virginia is when compared 
with the rest of the world. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although previous case law implicitly foreclosed all challenges to 
felon disenfranchisement laws, there is a silver lining to be found in the 
“evolving standards” guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.  This 
guarantee carried the day in Graham v. Florida, and consequently, the 
Court reinvigorated the view of the Eighth Amendment as a rising bar.  
Furthermore, the Court in Graham rearticulated the previous “death is 
different” jurisprudence, expanding its scope under the Eighth Amendment.  
In so doing, the Court opened the door for a lifetime felon 
disenfranchisement claim under a more exacting scrutiny than would have 
been available before Graham. 
 
212 Wilkins, supra note 109, at 90. 
213 SENTENCING PROJECT ET AL., BARRIERS TO DEMOCRACY I (2007), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_PETITION_TO_IACHR_final_
formatted.pdf. 
214 Demleitner, supra note 7, at 758–59. 
215 ALEC EWALD & BRANDON ROTTINGHAUS, CRIMINAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 110–11 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court of Canada 
struck down its prisoner-disenfranchisement provision in 2002 and the European Court of 
Human Rights declared universal suffrage for all, including felons, as “the basic principle”). 
216 SENTENCING PROJECT ET AL., supra note 213, at V. 
217 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
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In the context of Virginia’s permanent disenfranchisement of all 
felons, petitioners may have success launching an attack on Virginia’s law 
in the wake of Graham.  Given the Reconstruction Act of 1870, the state 
would have a difficult time arguing that its disenfranchisement provision is 
regulatory, not punitive.  Surviving this threshold issue will allow a 
petitioner to point to the recent reform amongst the majority of the states to 
include more ex-offenders on their voting rolls.  Moreover, strong 
arguments support the position that permanent disenfranchisement for all 
felonies (certainly a wide range of crimes given the complexities of the 
modern penal code) cannot rationally serve any legitimate penological goal. 
In assessing whether the provision runs afoul of the Eighth 
Amendment’s guarantee of protection from “cruel and unusual 
punishments,” a court may wish to consider international opinions on 
permanent disenfranchisement of felons.  Because the international 
community has largely condemned disenfranchisement, this inquiry will 
only serve to bolster this claim. 
If a petitioner can successfully challenge one of the two harshest felon 
disenfranchisement provisions in court, the long march toward true 
universal suffrage may begin.  With an estimated 5.3 million men and 
women in the United States currently unable to speak with their ballot 
because of a past conviction,
218
 we must extend the franchise to all citizens 
including those convicted of a felony before we can realize true political 
equality.  As the Supreme Court noted in Gray v. Sanders, “[t]he 
conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to 
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and 
Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one 
vote.”219 
 
218 SENTENCING PROJECT, VOTING RIGHTS, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/
page.cfm?id=133 (last visited February 11, 2012). 
219 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). 
